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TORT LAW: WHAT DEFENSES ARE THERE To A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION IN OHIO?-Bowling v. Heil Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d
277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987); Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 31
Ohio St. 3d 296, 511 N.E.2d 388 (1987).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Products liability actions in Ohio, having their heritage in contract
and negligence actions, have emerged as a separate body of law.1 Considering this heritage, there has been concern over the availability of
contract and negligence defenses such as comparative negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. In two 1986 cases, the
Ohio Supreme Court addressed these concerns. In Bowling v. Heil Co.2
the court decided the issue of whether the principles of comparative
negligence are applicable to products liability cases based upon strict
liability in tort.' The Ohio Supreme Court also discussed the issues of
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk." In a companion
case, Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co.,' the Ohio Supreme Court specifically discussed and applied the defense of assumption of the risk in a
strict products liability action.' The court also discussed the use of a
negligence action for a defective product case and the corresponding
negligence defenses of contributory and comparative negligence.,
This casenote will focus on the Ohio Supreme Court's distinction
between implied assumption of the risk and its dissimilarity to the doctrine of contributory negligence. This casenote will also discuss how
assumption of the risk, as a complete defense to a products liability
action, does not revive the doctrine of contributory negligence. Finally
this casenote will discuss Ohio's express or implied assumption of the
risk statute and how it affects the decisions of Bowling and Onderko,
and future litigation.

1. Bowling v. Heil Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 279, 511 N.E.2d 373,
375 (1987).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 285-86, 511 N.E.2d at 379-80 (The court decided that contribution among joint
tortfeasors did not abolish the doctrine of joint and several liability and held that comparative
negligence did not apply to strict products liability actions).
4. Id. at 282-83, 511 N.E.2d at 378.
5. 31 Ohio St. 3d 296, 511 N.E.2d 388 (1987).
6. Id. at 298-99, 511 N.E.2d at 390-91.
7. Id. at 300, 511 N.E.2d at 391.
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FACTS AND HOLDING

Bowling v. Heil Co.
Emma K. Bowling brought a wrongful death action against the

Heil Company, among others,8 for the death of her husband. 9 David B.
Bowling died when he was crushed between the chassis of a truck and
the dump bed mounted on it.' The defendant, Heil, was in the business of manufacturing and selling dumptruck beds and hydraulic dump

hoist systems which are attached to various models of trucks."1 On
April 26, 1980, an employee of Rodgers, the owner of the dumptruck,

made the vehicle available to Timothy Brashear for his personal use.1 2
Brashear's brother, David, knowing Mr. Bowling needed gravel for his
driveway, contacted David Bowling. 3 All three men purchased five
tons of gravel and returned to the Bowling residence where Timothy
Brashear backed the truck into the driveway and raised the bed to
spread the gravel.1 4 When Brashear tried to lower the bed, it would not
descend due to the fact that one of the welds for the hydraulic hoist
control failed.1 5 David Bowling leaned over the chassis, underneath the
raised bed, to investigate the problem. 6 He grabbed the control lever
on the pump valve assembly with his hand and the dump bed rapidly
descended upon him, killing him instantly.'
Bowling's wife proceeded against Heil on negligence and strict
products liability theories.18 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Mrs. Bowling and assessed damages at $1.75 million. 9 Upon written
interrogatories, the jury determined that Heil was both negligent and

8. Other defendants named in the suit were Ralph Rodgers, owner of the dumptruck which
killed David Bowling; Jake Sweeney Chevrolet, Inc., a Heil distributor who originally equipped
the truck with a cable controlled hydraulic dump hoist; and Robco, Inc., another Heil distributor
which replaced the cable controlled hoist system with a lever controlled hoist system. Bowling, 31
Ohio St. 3d at 277, 511 N.E.2d at 374. Prior to trial Robco settled with Mrs. Bowling for
$100,000 and was dismissed. Id. at 278, 511 N.E.2d at 374. During the trial Devers also settled
and was dismissed. Id. At the close of the evidence, Sweeney was granted a directed verdict on its
crossclaim for indemnity against Heil. Id.
9. Id. at 277, 511 N.E.2d at 374.
10. Id.
Id.
I.
12. Id. at 278, 511 N.E.2d at 374.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The jury determined that Heil was both negligent and strictly liable and that Bowling was contributorily negligent but that he had not assumed a known risk. Id. They attributed
the fault at forty percent to Heil, thirty percent to Bowling, and thirty percent to Robco. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss1/9

19891

PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENSES

strictly liable, and that Bowling was contributorily negligent. But, the
jury determined that he had not assumed a known risk. 0 After modification of the damages by the Ohio Court of Appeals, the case went to
the Ohio Supreme Court upon a motion to certify the record. 1
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that
Ohio's comparative negligence statute2 2 did not apply to products liability actions grounded in strict liability. 3 However, the Ohio Supreme
Court disagreed with the appellate court's holding that contributory
negligence, when it amounts to affirmative action as opposed to a passive failure to discover a defect in a product or to guard against the
possibility of such defect, constituted a defense to a products liability
action.2 ' The court of appeals also had erroneously applied a pure comparative negligence principle when it apportioned the respective degrees
of fault between Heil's strict liability and Bowling's contributory negligence. 2 5 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed both of these holdings, recognizing the differences between the policy and goals underlying negligence actions and those underlying strict products liability actions.2 6
For instance, the court of appeals construed Comment n to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A2 7 and held that a plaintiff's passive contributory negligence provides no defense, but his contributorily negligent "affirmative action" does provide a defense to a
products liability action. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and held that Comment n does not recognize a middle ground
which would fall between failure to discover and voluntary assumption
of the risk. Instead, the court determined that Comment n covers all

20. Id.
21. Id. at 278, 511 N.E.2d at 375. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the jury's
verdict, but remanded the case with directions to enter judgment against Heil for only forty percent of $1.75 million or $700,000.
22. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
23. Bowling v. Heil Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 279, 511 N.E.2d 373, 375 (1987).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Strict liability is governed by the distinct principles of strict liability in tort. Id. at
282, 511 N.E.2d at 377. These require liability even where a manufacturer has exercised all possible care, unlike negligence actions, which require the element of ordinary care. Id.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) provides:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility
of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the
danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured
by it, he is barred from recovery.
28. Bowling, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 282, 511 N.E.2d at 378.
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conduct considered to be contributorily negligent. 9 Under Comment n,
either a plaintiff's contributory negligence is considered a voluntary assumption of the risk or it is not. If it is, then it is a defense in a strict
liability action.3 0 The jury originally found Bowling was contributorily
negligent but had not voluntarily assumed a known risk, therefore his
contributory negligence was not a defense for Heil. 1
After recognizing no support in existing Ohio law for the acceptance of comparative negligence as a defense in products liability actions, the Ohio Supreme Court went on to determine that comparative
negligence is not a proper defense.3 2 Because this issue was one of first
impression, the Ohio Suprefne Court looked to case law, of other jurisdictions for guidance. 33 However, the case law is conflicting.3 4 The
Ohio Supreme- Court agreed with the decision in Kindard v. Coats Co.,
Inc.,3 5 Which stated:
Products liability under Section 402A does not rest upon negligence
principles, but rather on the concept of enterprise liability for casting a
defective product into the stream of commerce. .

.

.Thus, the focus is

upon the nature of the product, and the consumer's reasonable expectations with regard to that product, rather than on the conduct either of
the manufacturer or the person injured because the product.3 "
Upon holding that comparative negligence has no application to
products liability cases, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the reduction
of Mrs. Bowling's verdict by the court of appeals.3 7

29. Id. at 283,.511 N.E.2d at 378.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court reached this decision after it evaluated the public policy underlying the
application of strict liability in tort to products liability cases. Id. at 283-85, 511 N.E.2d 378-79.
The court said that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of
production. Those who are merchants and those engaged in manufacturing have the capacity to
distribute the losses of the few among the many who purchase the products. Id.
33. Id. at 285, 511 N.E.2d at 379.
34. Comparative negligence has been applied in products liability cases by a number of
courts. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Mulherin v. IngersollRand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981). Numerous courts have refused to apply comparative negligence principles to products liability cases. See, e.g., Correig v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388
Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983); Younig's Machine Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 692 P.2d 24
(1984); Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979); Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319,
609 P.2d 1382 (1980).
35. 37 Colo. App. 555, 557, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976).
36. Id.
37. Bowling v. Heil Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 286, 511 N.E.2d 373, 380 (1987). The court of
appeals also held that under Ohio's Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act a strictly liable
defendant is not jointly and severally liable for damages attributable to the negligence of another
defendant. The Ohio Supreme Court held that these statutes did not abolish the longstanding
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Justice Holmes dissented from the majority opinion.3 8 He found
Bowling's conduct, as a matter of law, to be an assumption of the risk
because Bowling's conduct was wholly self-initiated and independent of
any defect within the product.3 9 Justice Holmes felt the majority's
standard for assumption of the risk was impractical in that it required
the jury to determine Bowling's subjective state of mind at the instant
he reached under the truckbed.' 0 Justice Holmes would hold, that if
Heil were to use the defense of assumption of the risk, Heil would have
to demonstrate that Bowling intentionally and unreasonably exposed
himself to danger. Heil would also have to show that, though possibly
created by Heil, the danger was known or should have been known to
Bowling."1 Holmes would consider the obviousness of the danger, the
voluntary nature of Bowling's actions and the existence of the warning
labels on the truckbed as dispositive. Holmes would hold that Bowling
had unreasonably assumed a known risk."2
Holmes also believed that strict products liability is tied to, and
based upon, negligence theory. Therefore, for Holmes, the comparative
negligence defense is applicable to strict products liability as well."'
B.

Onderko v. Richmond Manufacturing Co.

The facts of the second of the Ohio Supreme Court cases are as
follows. In Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co.," the plaintiff, James
Onderko, was injured when an auger on a horizontal earth-boring machine allegedly lurched forward and entangled his clothing."8 The accident caused Onderko to lose his right arm and much of his right shoulder. 6 Onderko brought suit alleging strict products liability and
negligence actions against the product supplier, Syracuse Supply Company, and the named manufacturing defendant, Richmond Manufacturing Company. " Onderko withdrew his negligence claim during the
course of the trial. The jury was instructed that, if they decided that

common law doctrine of joint and several liability in Ohio, and therefore reversed the court of
appeals.
38. Id. at 288, 511 N.E.2d at 382.
39. Id. at 289, 511 N.E.2d at 382.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 289, 511 N.E.2d at 383. The warning stated: " CAUTION: WHENEVER THE
BODY IS IN ANY ELEVATED OR RAISED POSITION IT MUST BE SECURELY
PROPPED OR BLOCKED SO IT CAN NOT FALL ON ANYONE." Id. at 290, 511 N.E.2d
at 383.
42. Id. at 289-91, 511 N.E.2d at 383-84.
43. Id. at 292, 511 N.E.2d at 385.
.44. 31 Ohio St. 3d 296, 511 N.E.2d 388 (1987).
45. Id. at 297, 511 N.E.2d at 389.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Onderko had assumed the risk, they should determine the extent to
which Onderko's conduct contributed to his injury, by assigning to it a
percentage of total responsibility. If Onderko's responsibility was less
than fifty percent of the total, they were instructed to enter a verdict in
his favor. 8 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Onderko and, in
response to interrogatories, found that Onderko had assumed the risk
which was a proximate cause of his injury."9 The jury apportioned fault
among the parties at sixty percent to Richmond Manufacturing Company, fifteen percent to Syracuse Supply Company and twenty-five percent to Onderko.5 The $2,500,000 damage award was reduced twentyfive percent to $1,875,000 before it was awarded to Onderko.5 1
The Ohio Court of Appeals found no error with the trial court's
instruction to the jury on comparative negligence principles in a strict
products liability action and upheld the court's reduction of the
award. 2 The court reasoned that principles of comparative fault should
apply in strict liability cases. It stated that assumption of the risk is not
a complete bar to recovery, but rather, serves only to reduce the
amount of the judgment.5 3 The case then went to the Ohio Supreme
Court on a motion to certify the record.5 4
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized the inconsistency of the jury
instruction. 5 5 The jury was first told that if Onderko had assumed the
risk, then he was barred from recovery. The jury was later told that
assumption of the risk merely reduced the judgment if the assumption
of the risk constituted fifty percent or less of the total responsibility.5
Quoting from the decision of Bowling v. Heil Co.,57 which it had decided earlier that day, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the "principles of comparative negligence or comparative fault have no application
to a products liability case based upon strict liability in tort, and an
otherwise strictly liable defendant has a complete defense if the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly assumed the risk occasioned by the
58
defect."
On the subject of conflicting jury instructions, when a court states
a correct rule or principle of law and also states an incorrect rule or

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389-90, 511 N.E.2d at 389-90.
Id. at 298, 511 N.E.2d at 390.
Id.
Id. at 298-99, 511 N.E.2d at 390.
31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987).
Onderko, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 299, 511 N.E.2d at 390-91.
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principle of law with reference to the same subject matter, no presumption arises that the correct rule was applied by the jury. The error in
giving the incorrect rule will be deemed prejudicial. 59 In such a case,
reversal of the jury verdict is mandated and remand for retrial is ordered where the appealing party is not clearly entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. 60 The Ohio Supreme Court held that Richmond was not
clearly entitled to judgment because at the time the jury instruction
was given it was not clearly erroneous since Bowling had not yet been
decided.6 1 The court also held that, since the jury determined that
Onderko had assumed the .risk, the verdict could not stand. They re62
manded the case for retrial.
The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that assumption of the risk as
a total bar to recovery is not as harsh as it appears. That is, foreclosure
of recovery on a strict products liability theory does not deprive an injured plaintiff of all possible remedies. 6 3 A plaintiff injured by a product is not limited to a strict products liability action. Rather, he may
also bring an action in negligence. 4 They are separate theories but are
not mutually exclusive; both can be pleaded as causes of action.6 5 The
court reasoned that, in such instances, the plaintiff's assumption of the
risk would not necessarily be an absolute bar to the negligence action,
but would merely reduce his recovery, provided that the assumption of
the risk is less than fifty percent of the total responsibility for the injuries incurred. 6
Justices Sweeney and Holmes dissented. 7 Justice Sweeney believed that since Ohio has adopted a comparative negligence defense to
negligence claims, Ohio is no longer an "all or nothing" jurisdiction.
Therefore, in the interest of fundamental fairness, Ohio should not be
an "all or nothing" jurisdiction in strict products liability cases.6 8 Justice Sweeney stated that under a pure comparative fault analysis, no
defense would be a total bar to recovery unless the plaintiff was one
hundred percent at fault. "Thus, a defendant's liability would remain
69
strict.

59. Bosjnak v. Superior Sheet Steel Co., 145 Ohio St. 538, 539, 62 N.E.2d 305, 306 (1945).
60. Id.; see also Westropp v. E.W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947);
Marcoguiseppe v. State, 114 Ohio St. 299, 151 N.E. 182 (1926).
61. Onderko, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 300, 511 N.E.2d at 391.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 300, 511 N.E.2d at 392.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d § 16:31 (1987).
66. Onderko, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 301, 511 N.E.2d at 392.
67. Id. at 302-05, 511 N.E.2d at 393-95.
68. Id. at 302, 511 N.E.2d at 393.
69. Id. at 303. 511 N.E.2d at 393.
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Justice Holmes, who also dissented in Bowling, agreed with Justice
Sweeney that the principles of comparative negligence are warranted in
the determination of the causal fault of the injuries sustained and the

-fair distribution of the burdens of compensation for such injuries.7 0
Both Justices would have affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.7 '
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Products Liability Law in Ohio

Products liablity law has evolved in Ohio as a separate identifiable
body of law stemming from contract and negligence case law.71 The
seminal case where Ohio courts accepted strict liability in a products
case was Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.7 3 The Rogers court held
that the manufacturer ought to be held to strict accountability to any
consumer who buys a product in reliance on representations by the
manufacturer and later suffers injury because the product is defective.7 ' Eight years later, in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.,r actions
in tort based upon a theory of implied warranty were merged with the
theories in the Rogers case. In the 1977 case of Temple v. Wean
United, Inc.,76 the Ohio Supreme Court adopted section 402A of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts outright."
Four years later in Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.,7* strict
products liability protection, which had already been extended to defectively manufactured products, was extended to defectively designed

70. Id. at 304, 511 N.E.2d at 394.
71. Id. at 304-05, 511 N.E.2d at 394-95.
72. Id. at 279, 511 N.E.2d at 375.
73. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) (A consumer injured by a defect in a product
could maintain an action in tort against the manufacturer based upon express warranty, though no
contractual relationship existed between them.).
74. Id. at 249, 147 N.E.2d at 615-16.
75. 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
76. 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
77.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS § 402A (1965)

states:

I. One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to lihbility for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
2. The rule stated in subsection one applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
78. 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
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products."9 Leichtamer recognized that the policy behind the strict liability doctrine was based on the notion that. "the public interest in
human life and safety [could] best be protected by subjecting manufacturers of defectively designed products to strict liability in tort when
[those] products cause harm;" '80 The following year, in Knitz v. Minster
Machine Co., 81 the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that
the cause of action in a case involving defectively designed products is
based on strict liability in tort because of consumer expectations. Finally, in Cremeans v. InternationalHarvester Co.,"2 the Ohio Supreme
Court emphasized that the focus of a products liability case is on the
product and the nature of its defect, not on the conduct of the
manufacturer. 3
B.

Defenses

Prior to the California Supreme Court decision in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods. Inc.,84 and the publishing of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A,8 5 the common law doctrine of contributory negligence prevailed as a defense to products liability actions.8 6 At that
time, contributory negligence was removed as a total bar to recovery
for strict liability in tort for defective products.87 Comment n to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A states that contributory negligence which constitutes assumption of the risk is a total bar to strict
liability recovery. 88
In Ohio law governing products liability actions there are two defenses based upon plaintiff's misconduct, assumption of the risk and

79. Id. at 456, 424 N.E.2d 570. The doctrine of strict liability emerged in an effort to place
liability on the manufacturer of a defective product in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
80. Leichtamer, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 464-65, 424 N.E.2d at 575.
81. 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (1982).
82. 6 Ohio St. 3d 232, 452 N.E.2d 1281 (1983).
83. Id. at 234-35, 452 N.E.2d at 1284. The Cremeans case also states that the negligence
concept of ordinary care is not a part of the products liability doctrine.. Instead strict products
liability is governed by principles which impose liability even when the manufacturer has exercised
all reasonable care. Id.
84. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
86. S. DARLING, OHIO CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 111 (1987).

87. Id.
88. Id. at 112. By 1974, a majority of states shifted from contributory negligence to comparative negligence as a defense. Id. The key decision, which was pronounced by the California
Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978), concluded that the "expressed purposes which persuaded us in the first instance to
adopt strict liability . . .would not be thwarted were we to apply comparative principles." Id. at
737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
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comparative negligence.8 9 A strictly liable defendant has a complete

defense if the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly assumed an unreasonable risk occasioned by the defect. 90 Comment n of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts Section 402A also sets out an assumption of the risk

defense which was adopted by Ohio.9 1

In Anderson v. Ceccardi,92 the Ohio Supreme Court merged implied assumption of the risk with the doctrine of contributory negli-

93
gence for the purposes of the comparative negligence statute. In
9" the Ohio Supreme Court declared that the princiWilfong v. Batdorf,

ples of comparative negligence are part of the common law of Ohio.

95
Concommitant with the 1987 decisions in Bowling v. Heil Co.
and Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co.,98 Ohio established by statute the
defense of assumption of the risk.97 The statute was intended generally

89. One defense recognized in Ohio is misuse of the product by the plaintiff in an unforseeable manner. See Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St. 3d 75, 472 N.E.2d 707
(1984). This distinct defense is not the focus of this casenote and will no longer be discussed.
90. See Jones v. White Motor Corp., 61 Ohio App. 2d 162, 401 N.E.2d 223 (1978); see
also Ettin v. AVA Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969); Maiorino v. Weco
Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965).
91. See supra, note 27, and accompanying text.
92. 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983).
93. Id. at 113, 451 N.E.2d at 783; see Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Baldwin 1989).
94. 6 Ohio St. 3d 100, 451 N.E.2d 1185 (1983).
95. 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987).
96. 31 Ohio St. 3d 296, 511 N.E.2d 388 (1987).
97. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
Express or implied assumption of the risk as affirmative defense to product liability claim.
(A) As used in this section, "claimant," "harm," "product liability claim," and "supplier" have the same meanings as in section 2307.71 of the Revised Code.
(B)(1) Express or implied assumption of the risk may be asserted as an affirmative
defense to a product liability claim under sections 2307.71 to 2307.80 of the Revised Code.
(2) Subject to division (B)(3) of this section, if express or implied assumption of the
risk is asserted as an affirmative defense to a product liability claim under sections 2307.71
to 2307.80 of the Revised Code and if it is determined that the claimant expressly or
impliedly assumed a risk and that such express or implied assumption of the risk was a
direct and proximate cause of harm for which. the claimant seeks to recover damages, the
express or implied assumption of the risk is a complete bar to the recovery of those
damages.
(3) If implied assumption of the risk is asserted as an affirmative defense to a product
liability claim against a supplier under division (A)(1) of section 2307.78 of the Revised
Code, section 2315.19 of the Revised Code is applicable to that affirmative defense and
shall be used to determine whether the claimant is entitled to recover compensatory damages based on that claim and the amount of any recoverable compensatory damages.
(C)(1) Except as provided in division (C)(2) of this section, contributory negligence is
not an affirmative defense to a product liability claim under sections 2307.71 to 2307.80 of
the Revised Code.
(2) Contributory negligence may be asserted as an affirmative defense to a product
liability claim against a supplier under division (A)(1) of section 2307.78 of the Revised
Code. If contributory negligence is asserted as an affirmative defense to such a product
liability claim, section 2315.19 of the Revised Code is applicable to that affirmative defense
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to preserve the existing common law controlling contributory negligence and assumption of the risk defenses. It provides that contributory
negligence is not a defense for products liability claims based on strict
liability and that express or implied assumption of the risk is a total
bar to recovery. The statute provides that, for a products liability action against a supplier, the comparative negligence statute controls.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Ohio Supreme Court, in rejecting the Ohio Court of Appeals'
analysis of Comment n to the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
402A in Bowling v. Heil Co.,98 categorized assumption of the risk as a
form of contributory negligence. 99 The literal reading of Comment n,
would lead one to believe that assumption of the risk is a category of
contributory negligence. The Ohio Supreme Court further held that
contributory negligence that amounts to assumption of the risk is a
complete defense. °00 Relying on the trial court decision that Mr. Bowling had not assumed the risk, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Heil
did not have an assumption of the risk defense.' But, the analysis is
not quite that simple. The same day that the Ohio Supreme Court decided Bowling, they also decided Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co., °2
where the court stated that for assumption of the risk to be a defense
the injured party must voluntarily and unreasonably assume a known
risk.'0 3 Later in the same opinion, the court discussed the logic behind
assumption of the risk as a separate defense from contributory negligence.' 0 4 The court stated that foreclosure of recovery by assumption of
the risk in a strict products liability claim does not deprive an injured
plaintiff of all remedies.' The court held that a plaintiff injured by a
product was not limited to an action in strict liability, but could also
bring an action in negligence.' 06 The court also stated that a plaintiff

and shall be used to determine whether the claimant is entitled to recover compensatory
damages based on that claim and the amount of any recoverable compensatory damages.
98. 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987).
99. Id. at 283, 511 N.E. 2d at 378.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 31 Ohio St. 3d 296, 511 N.E.2d 388 (1987).
103. Id. at 299, 511 N.E.2d at 391. See also Digges and Billmyre, Product Liability in
Maryland: Traditional & Emerging Theories of Recovery and Defense, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 1,
40-41 (1986) (A defendant relying on an assumption of the risk defense must prove the plaintiff
actually knew and appreciated the particular risk or danger created by the defect, the plaintiff
voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing the danger, and the plaintiffis decision to encounter the known risk was unreasonable.).
104. Onderko. 31 Ohio St. 3d at 300-01, 511 N.E.2d at 392.
105. Id.
106. Id. A case in which the plaintiff alleges strict products liability, may also be submitted
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whose recovery is barred on a strict liability claim because he assumed
the risk, may still recover on a negligence theory where such negligence
can be proved. 107 If assumption of the risk barred recovery under strict
products liability, it would also bar recovery based on negligence if assumption of the risk was considered contributory negligence and that
assumption of the risk was greater than fifty percent of the fault. Although the Ohio Supreme Court did not elaborate upon the difference
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence in Bowling, its
convictions were evident in the holding of Onderko.
According to the Onderko court, the premise underlying assumption of the risk defense is that a plaintiff who is aware of a known risk
and voluntarily assumes it unreasonably, should not recover for injuries
caused by the defective product. 1 8 This defense may be employed regardless of the plaintiff's theory of recovery. 0 9 In order for the defense
of assumption of the risk to be used, the defendant must prove all the
elements of the defense.11 0 The defendant must first prove that the
plaintiff knew the product was defective. " The mere failure to discover the defect is insufficient to establish this element, because notions
of contributory negligence would be interjected into assumption of the
risk. Therefore, a contributory negligence defense would be created, yet
it is not a defense in strict products liability actions. " 2 The defendant
must then show that the plaintiff appreciated the risk, voluntarily and
unreasonably took the risk presented by the defective product, and was
injured as a proximate result of the defect."' Although the literal
wording of Comment n to the Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A
seems to indicate that assumption of the risk is a type of contributory
negligence, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized assumption of the
risk as an independent defense."' Since assumption of the risk stands
on its own as a defense, contributory negligence is not revived as a bar
to recovery in strict products liability actions. "
Strict products liability is not based upon negligence principles,
rather, it rests upon the concept of enterprise liability for placing a

to the factfinder on a negligence theory.
107. Id.
108. See Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV.
643 (1978).
109. Digges & Billmyre, supra note 103, at 40.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.at 41.
112. Id.
113. See Hasten, Comparative Liability Principles: Should They Now Apply to Strict
Products Liability Actions in Ohio? 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1151 (1983).
114. Id. at 1160 n.26.
115. Id. at 1182.
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defective product into the stream of commerce. 1 "[T]he focus is upon
the nature of the product and the consumer's reasonable expectations
with regard to that product, rather than on the conduct of either the
manufacturer or the person injured because of the product.'" 7 Strict
products liability does not look at fault;" 8 however, that is exactly what
the defense of assumption of the risk does. It looks to see to what extent the plaintiff assumed an unreasonable and known risk. Since the
plaintiff was at "fault," he is barred from recovery. For this defense to
make sense and be fair, the plaintiff should only be barred if his
"fault," his assumption of the risk, is greater than the liability of the
manufacturer who placed a defective product into the stream of commerce. This would create a comparative fault analysis. However, the
Ohio Supreme Court rejected using a comparative negligence/fault
analysis for strict products liability in Bowling, based on the underlying
policy of protecting the consumers' expectations. If the underlying policy is to protect the consumers' expectations by not looking to the manufacturer's fault, the consumers' expectation of being :protected from
defective products are lessened by allowing the manufacturer to use the
plaintiff's fault to prove that the plaintiff assumed the risk and therefore bar recovery. It encourages a manufacturer to worry less about
defects by providing a defense of complete immunity.
The Ohio Supreme Court tried to downplay the harshness of the
assumption of the risk defense as a total bar to recovery in its holding
in Onderko. The court stated that a plaintiff could also bring an action
based on negligence, and although the plaintiffs' assumption of the risk
will totally bar the products liability action, it will serve only to reduce
the amount of damages the plaintiff would recover under the negligence theory. There are a few problems with this logic. First, it as:
sumes a plaintiff will have a negligence action. What about those plaintiffs that cannot establish lack of ordinary care, which is subject to the
reasonable man test, by the defendant? Second, it assumes the jury will
determine that the assumption of the risk by the plaintiff is less than
fifty percent of the total fault, and this would require a comparative
fault analysis when the jury is not supposed to consider the fault of the
manufacturer. Third, although assumption of the risk is a defense of its
own in a negligence action, it can be argued that assumption of the risk
is just another name for contributory negligence. The facts of a case

116. Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 557, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976).
117. Id.
118. But see Note, Loosing the Shackles of "No-Fault" in Strict Liability: A Better Approach to Comparative Fault, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 339 (1984). Since it is defectiveness of a
product which underlies a strict products liability cause of action, it cannot be logically stated that
such cause of action is not conceptually predicated on fault principles. Id. at 253-54.
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will be the same for both causes of action. The activity which is classified as assumption of the risk in the products liability action based
upon strict liability is readily classifiable as contributory negligence in
the negligence action. This all seems like a rule of labels, but it can
have a significant impact on how to approach a lawsuit and the outcome of the suit if attorneys are not careful as to which cause of action
they bring.
As Justice Holmes pointed out in his dissent in Bowling, "[i]n
such interpretation of the law, there is a vast capacity for abusive
pleadings, wherein one may plead negligence merely to have the procedural right to describe his conduct before the jurors. On the other
hand, one may remove the negligence count to prevent the opposing
counsel from describing conduct."" 9
Justice Sweeney, in his dissent in Onderko, also criticized the reasoning in Bowling. He stated that:
Plaintiffs' attorneys will almost always characterize their client's conduct
as "contributory negligence", since assumption of the risk acts as a total
bar to recovery. Defense attorneys, on the other hand, will almost always
attempt to show the plaintiff's conduct constituted 'assumption of the
risk' since such a defense, if successful, will prevent any recovery by the
plaintiff from their clients.12
Another problem Justice Holmes pointed out in his dissent in Bowling is that of jury confusion.1 21 Holmes stated that courts have a responsibility to encourage consistency in jury instructions and problems
are created when the combined effects of jury instructions regarding
products liability and negligence creates a morass of competing and
conflicting obligations. 2 A negligence pleading allows a jury instruction for mitigation of damages and the jury must compare and balance
the fault of all parties. 2 3 A pleading in strict liability requires an in2
struction for either full recovery or no recovery. ' Justice Holmes provided an excellent example: "suppos[e] a pleading [is] framed in negligence, strict liability and/or breach of warranty, with multiple
the plaindefendants who each assert various legal theories to describe
2
certainty.'
a
almost
is
tiff's conduct, then juror confusion
Both Justice Sweeney and Justice Holmes believe the problem of

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
American

Bowling, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 293, 511 N.E.2d at 385.
Onderko, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 303, 511 N.E.2d at 394.
Bowling, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 293, 511 N.E.2d at 385.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 293, 511 N.E.2d at 386; see Hasten, supra note 113, at 1177; see also Stueve v.
Honda Motors Co. Inc., 457 F. Supp. 740, 751 (D. Kan. 1978).
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classifying the plaintiff's actions as assumption of the risk or contributory negligence and the problem of no fault of the manufacturer versus
the degree of fault of the plaintiff would be solved by adopting a pure
comparative fault analysis in strict products liability cases. 12 6' Research
indicates a trend toward applying comparative fault principles to strict
products liability actions.1 27
Since the decisions in Bowling and Onderko, the Ohio legislature
has enacted a statute specifically dealing with assumption of the risk as
an affirmative defense to a products liability claim. 2 8 This statute was
intended to preserve the existing common law controlling contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk for a products liability claim.' 2 9
The statute states, for product liability claims based on strict liability,
that contributory negligence is not a defense'3 0 and express or implied
assumption of the risk is a total bar to recovery.'
This statute permits an assumption of the risk defense in a negligence-based product liability claim against a supplier. 3 When a negligence claim is brought against a supplier the comparative negligence
statute controls.' 33 Contributory negligence and implied assumption of
the risk are included in the comparative process of the comparative
negligence statute.' 3 " It must be stressed that this section of the statute

126. Bowling, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 296, 511 N.E.2d at 387; Onderko, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 304,
511 N.E.2d at 394.
127. See, e.g., Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 110-14, 454 N.E.2d 197, 204-05
(1983); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 160-64, 406 A.2d 140,
145-47 (1979); Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of General Motors, 292 Or. 590, 590-92, 642 P.2d
624, 624-25 (1982). It also appears to be supported in scholarly literature. See, e.g., PROSSER &
KEETON LAW OF TORTS 468, 478 (5th ed. 1984); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L.
REV. 465 (1953); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence. 42 TENN. L. REV. 171
(1974).
128. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). The provisions of §
2315.20 "shall apply only to product liability actions that are commenced on and after the effective date of this act and that are based upon claims for relief that arise on or after that date."Id.
129. A products liability claim is defined by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(M) (Baldwin
Supp. 1989).
(M) "Product liability claim" means a claim that is asserted in a civil action and that
seeks to recover compensatory damages from a manufacturer or supplier for death, physical injury to person, emotional distress, or physical damage to property other than the
product in question, that allegedly arose from any of the following:
(I) The design, formulation, production, construction, creation, assembly, rebuilding,
testing, or marketing of that product;
(2) Any warning or instruction, or lack of warning or instruction, associated with that
product;
(3) Any failure of that product to conform
to any relevant representation or warranty.
130. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20(C)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1989).
131. Id. § 2315.20(B)(2).
132. Id. § 2315.20(B)(3) and (C)(2).
133. Id. § 2315.19.
134. Id.
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applies to a negligence-based claim of products liability and not to a
strict products liability claim which does not allow contributory negli13 5
gence or comparative negligence as a defense.
The key to determining what defense is available is to recognize
who the plaintiff is suing and on what theory of recovery. Some examples are helpful in understanding the code:
1. For a strict products liability claim against the manufacturer under
Ohio Revised Code Section 2307.73 or against a supplier, under Section
2307.78(A)(2) or Section 2307.78(B), conduct of a plaintiff which constitutes contributory negligence but not assumption of the risk is not an
affirmative defense. Conduct of a plaintiff which constitutes assumption
of the risk (whether that conduct also constitutes contributory negligence
or whether it constitutes assumption1 6of the risk but not contributory negligence) is a total bar to recovery. 1
2. For a negligence-based product liability claim against a supplier under
Ohio Revised Code Section 2307.78(A)(1), the comparative negligence
statute controls. Thus, express assumption of the risk, whether reasonable or unreasonable, is a total bar to recovery, and implied assumption of
into the
the risk, whether reasonable or unreasonable, is merged
37
comparative process with contributory negligence.
Had Ohio's statute on assumption of the risk as a defense to products
liability claims been in effect when Bowling and Onderko were decided,
the outcome of these cases would not have been changed. The facts of
a
Bowling fit into the pattern of example one. Mrs. Bowling brought
8 The
Heil."
manufacturer,
the
against
claim
strict products liability
Ohio Supreme Court deferred to the trial court's holding that Bowling
39
was contributorily negligent but he had not assumed a known risk.
Therefore, Heil could not use assumption of the risk as a defense to
Mrs. Bowling's claim. 4 ° It should be noted that, had Ohio's assumption of the risk statute been effective when Bowling was decided, Mrs.
" would not have been subject
Bowling, who also pleaded negligence,
to Heil's use of the statute to incorporate the comparative negligence
2
statute because Heil was a manufacturer and not a supplier.' Based
on Mrs. Bowling's negligence claim, however, Heil could have used
Ohio's comparative negligence statute directly, as a defense for the

135. S. DARLING. supra note 86, at 113.
136. Id. at 114.
137. Id.
138. Bowling v. Heil Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 374 (1987).
139. Id. at 283, 511 N.E 2d at 378.
140. § 2315.20(C)(1).
141. Bowling, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 278, 511 N.E.2d at 374.
142. § 2315.19
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negligence claim only.143
The facts of Onderko also fit into the pattern of example one. The
Ohio Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial because of conflicting jury instructions. 14 The jury found that Onderko had assumed
the risk, but because of the conflicting instructions the Court felt it
would not be proper to decide the case for either party. 1 5 If on remand
the jury again finds that Onderko assumed the risk, he will be barred
from recovery under a strict products liability action, but may not be
barred totally under a negligence cause of action.
The ramifications of these decisions are important not only upon
these cases but also future litigation. Since Onderko was remanded, the
holdings of these cases will dictate both parties strategies. Onderko's
attorney would bring both a negligence and a strict products liability
action. He would try to classify Onderko's actions (of working close to
the auger of the earth-boring machine), if at all, as contributory negligence rather than assumption of the risk to avoid being totally barred
from recovery. Onderko may not recover on his negligence action if the
jury determines that his contributory negligence was greater than fifty
percent of the total fault.
Recovery under the strict products liability action will be all or
nothing depending on the jury determination of whether Onderko had
assumed the risk. It seems logical that if the jury determined that
Onderko had assumed the risk, his contributory negligence would have
exceeded fifty percent of the total fault. So there is an argument that in
reality assumption of the risk is a harsh defense.
Richmond's attorney, on the other hand, would try to classify
Onderko's actions as assumption of the risk. In light of the fact that
Onderko had knowledge of other accidents of the same nature, it would
seem that he would have a good argument to totally bar Onderko from
recovery. The decision in Bowling, that comparative negligence principles do not apply to strict products liability actions, makes the incentive
even greater to the respective parties to classify or not classify
Onderko's actions as an assumption of the risk because of the all or
nothing recovery. Now that the court considers the defense of assumption of the risk as not that detrimental to plaintiffs case because of the
alternative negligence cause of action, it would seem that the court is
more likely to agree with a jury determination that plaintiff assumed
the risk. The court may then rely on negligence principles to compensate plaintiff if necessary.

143.
144.
145.

Id.
Onderko, 31 Ohio St. 3d at 299, 511 N.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 300, 511 N.E.2d at 391.
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Considering the facts of Bowling and the court's view of the harshness of the defense of assumption of the risk, it now seems likely that
Bowling would be found to have assumed the risk and would be barred
from recovery under a strict products liabiltiy theory. Bowling exposed
himself to the danger by leaning under a raised truckbed, still loaded,
to activate the hydraulic pump to lower the bed. This was coupled with
the fact that there was an express warning not to lean under the bed
without blocking it. Recovery may still result if it can be shown that
Heil's fault of placing a defective product into the stream of commerce
is greater than Bowling's fault of leaning under the truckbed. Considering the severity of the injury to Bowling and the great potential for
serious injuries associated with a defective dumptruck it is reasonable
to speculate that in this situation Mrs. Bowling would recover under a
negligence theory. These issues, of course, are up to the jury to decide.
V.

CONCLUSION

The issues of assumption of the risk, contributory negligence and
comparative negligence as defenses to actions in strict products liability
have caused some confusion. The issue of comparative negligence as an
affirmative defense in strict products liability was expressly rejected by
6
the Ohio Supreme Court in Bowling v. Heil Co., but the court added
some confusion to the issues of contributory negligence and assumption
of the risk. Comment n of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
also seems to indicate that assumption of the risk is a subcategory of
contributory negligence, thus adding to the confusion. The confusion is
resolved by the Ohio Supreme Court in its holding in Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co.,1 4 7 where it implied that assumption of the risk is a
separate yet distinct defense in a strict products liability claim. In addition, the Ohio legislature enacted Section 2315.20 which also resolved
the dispute.
Ohio has taken an affirmative position with respect to assumption
of the risk and comparative and contributory negligence as defenses in
a strict products liability action. Moreover, courts try to bring about
justice between manufacturers and consumers. Whether that justice is
accomplished by a comparative fault analysis, no fault analysis, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, or comparative negligence is not a settled issue nationally and arguments exist for all views.

146.
147.

31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987).
31 Ohio St. 3d 296, 511 N.E.2d 388 (1987).
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191

Whatever analysis is adopted by a jurisdiction, the goal should be to
compare the plaintiff's misconduct, if any, with the defendant's defective product.
Gregory S. Lampert
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